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FREEDOM OF SPEECH & PRESS
maintained, and they [had] an apparent basis in fact." ' 421
Both standards make clear what most courts have nonetheless
assumed, that merely because a statement is characterized as
opinion does not render it as such. The difference is that the
Supreme Court looks only to see if the language is "loose,
figurative or hyperbolic" in order to determine if the writer was
in fact, not seriously trying to convey fact. The New York Court
of Appeals looks not only to the language of the statement, but
also to the context of the publication as a whole in order to
determine if the reader would construe the statements as factual
assertions. The New York Court of Appeals declared that the
"narrow exemption" in Milkovich means that "insufficient
protection may be accorded to central values protected by the law
of this State." 422 The court expressly noted the history and
tradition of providing broader protection of freedom of
expression in this state than is provided by the federal courts.
Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis423
(decided May 7, 1991)
The plaintiff, Children of Bedford, Inc., a nonprofit
organization, challenged the constitutionality of New York
Executive Law, section 632-a.424 The organization, which was
receiving royalties from Jean Harris' book, Stranger in Two
Worlds, asserted that: 1) the book was not subject to the statute;
2) the statute violated federal 425 and state426 guarantees of free
speech; and 3) the proceedings conducted by the crime victims
421. Id. at 246, 567 N.E.2d at 1276, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
422. Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
423. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453, overruled in
part, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
424. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). This
statute, commonly known as the "Son of Sam" law, was enacted in order to
give crime victims financial assistance from the monetary benefits convicted
criminals receive for their written works. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at
719, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
425. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
426. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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board violated federal due process427 guarantees. The New York
Court of Appeals held "that the book [was] subject to the statute
and that the proceedings did not violate the [plaintiffs] due
process rights." 428 The court found that the statute serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to accomplish
that purpose.429 Hence, the statute was not violative of free
speech under either the Federal or New York State Constitution.
However, on December 10, 1991, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Member of the New York State Crime Victims Board, the United
States Supreme Court declared New York Executive Law section
632-a, the "Son of Sam" law, unconstitutional. 430 The Supreme
Court held that while the statute serves the state's compelling
state interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the
crime, the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve this
interest. 431
As stated above, the plaintiffs were a nonprofit organization
who were assigned the royalties from the publication of a book
entitled Stranger in Two Worlds. The book was written by Jean
Harris after her conviction and imprisonment in the Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility. Harris was convicted of the second degree
murder of Dr. Herman Tarnower. Stranger in Two Worlds is a
compilation of Harris' experience at the prison's children's center
with imprisoned mothers who were trying to maintain bonds with
their children. It is also the story of her life, including her life
with Tarnower, his murder, and her prison experiences. Before
publication, the publisher submitted a copy of its contract with
Harris and a copy of the book to the Crime Victims (Board). 432
The Board has the express duty of determining whether a book is
427. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
428. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 718-19, 573 N.E.2d at 543, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 455.
429. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
430. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
431. Id. at 509.
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subject to Executive Law section 632-a. 433 Executive Law
section 632-a, provides:
[Those] contracting with any person or the representative or as-
signee of any person accused or convicted of a crime in [New
York], with respect to the reenactment of such crime . . or
from the expression of such accused or convicted person's
thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such crime,
shall submit a copy of [the] contract to the [Crime Victims]
[B]oard .... 434
The court in Children of Bedford stated: "If the board deter-
mines that the criminal's work comes within the statute, any
moneys owing under the contract must be paid to the Board. The
funds are deposited in escrow for the benefit of the victims or
legal representatives of the victims of the crime." 435
The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court's
determination that the book was covered by the statute. The court
found that despite the fact that only two chapters of the book
contain Harris' version of the reenactment of her crime, "these
two chapters make up the core of the work around which the
narrative of Harris's life story is structured.",436 The court stated
that "[i]ndeed, it is apparent from the preliminary negotiations
between MacMillan and Harris and from the publicity
surrounding publication that MacMillan believed the book's
commercial value rested on subject matter within the statute." 437
Addressing the plaintiffs procedural due process claim, the
court stated that due process mandates reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 438 Applying this standard, the court
concluded that the preliminary findings of the Crime Victims
Board were made available to the plaintiff prior to the hearings,
thereby satisfying the notice requirement of the Due Process
Clause. The plaintiffs other procedural due process claim rested
433. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
434. Id.
435. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 720, 573 N.E.2d at 544, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 456.
436. Id. at 722, 573 N.E.2d at 545, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
437. Id.
438. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950).
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on the assertion that the Board acted improperly when it
functioned as both the prosecutor and judge. The court stated that
"[t]he [plaintiff] must demonstrate that because of this practice
the Board has been prejudiced by its investigation or for some
reason is disabled from hearing and deciding the matter on the
basis of the evidence." 439 On this issue, the court found that the
evidence in the case did not support the plaintiff's contention.
The court then addressed the plaintiff's free speech claim under
both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. Addressing
the free speech claim under the Federal Constitution first, the
court found that the book was protected speech under the First
Amendment. 440 In determining the standard of judicial review to
be applied to the governmental regulation of the speech, the court
first determined that the statute was a content based regulation.
The statute singles out speech on a particular subject, and then
imposes a financial burden on the speech. This is a direct burden
placed on this type of speech, and not placed on any other. The
court analogized the present case to Meyer v. Grant,441 a case in
which the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
Colorado statute was subject to strict scrutiny because it imposed
a financial burden on political speech by placing a limitation on
the number of people who could convey the political message. 442
Similarly, the New York Son of Sam law imposes an economic
disincentive for the publication of the criminal's reenactment or
depiction of the crime.
Accordingly, in order to justify the differential treatment
imposed by the statute, the state must demonstrate that the statute
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
439. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 723-24, 573 N.E.2d at 546, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 458 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975)).
440. Id. at 724-25, 573 N.E.2d at 546-47, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59 (citing
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("the
Commission of Crime(s)... are without question events of legitimate concern
to the public"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(defining the limited classes of speech "the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem")).
441. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
442. Id. at 422-23.
[Vol 8908
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tailored to achieve that state purpose.443 The court of appeals
found that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that
criminals do not profit from their crimes, as well as ensuring that
victims of crimes are compensated by those who harm them. The
court found that the Son of Sam law serves the state's compelling
interest by not only providing a method for victims to obtain
compensation, but also by reflecting the community's belief that
it is unacceptable for criminals to profit from their own
wrong. 44
The court then examined whether the statute was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve this compelling state interest.445 The concern in
this part of the analysis is to ensure that the means or methods
chosen by the government are not substantially broader than nec-
essary to carry out the governmental interest. It is at this stage of
the analysis that the New York Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court arrived at different conclusions.
The New York Court of Appeals found that the New York Son
of Sam law was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state
interest. 446 The court reasoned that the statute
creates a unique and identifiable resource and preserves it for the
benefit of victims directly injured by a crime to compensate them
for the damages sustained, gives them priority over the
criminal's other creditors and extends the time within which a
claim to the proceeds may be asserted by a victim. The statute
regulates only the criminal's receipt of money, not the right to
speak about the crime and it does not impose a forfeiture of all
profits - it merely delays payment (632-a[ll][c]). 447
The court noted that the statute provides an incentive for the
443. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987).
444. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 725-26, 573 N.E.2d at 547-48,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60; see also Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511, 22
N.E. 188, 190 (1889) ("No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,
or to the advantage of his own wrong.").
445. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 728, 573 N.E.2d at 549, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 461.
446. Id. at 729, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
447. Id. at 729-30, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
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criminal to speak because the proceeds from the speech will pay
for his or her legal fees. Additionally, the statute does not impose
a limitation on others who may be interested in telling the crimi-
nal's story. Thus, the court concluded that the reach of the statute
was limited to its purpose. 448
Nearly five months after Children of Bedford, the United States
Supreme Court, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Board,449 reviewed the Son of Sam law
and concluded that although the statute serves the state's
compelling interest of ensuring that victims are compensated
from the proceeds of the crime, the statute is not narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's purpose. 450 The United States
Supreme Court held that the New York Son of Sam law was
significantly over inclusive. 451 Thus, it found that "the statute
[was] inconsistent with the First Amendment.", 452 Unlike the
New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the New
York Son of Sam law encompassed a potentially large number of
works by its express language. The statute's broad definition of
"person convicted of a crime" enables the Crime Victims Board
to escrow the income of any author who admits to having
committed a crime. 453 The majority opinion, authored by Justice
O'Connor, cited several examples of the statute's broad
provision. This list included works such as the autobiography of
Malcolm X, which describes crimes committed by the civil rights
leader prior to his involvement in the movement; the Confessions
of Saint Augustine, in which the author admits to the theft of
pears from a neighboring vineyard; and a reference to a
bibliography submitted to the Court by the Association of
American Publishers, listing hundreds of works by prominent
figures whose autobiographies, if written, would be subject to the
statute.454 These authors included:
448. Id. at 730, 573 N.E.2d at 550, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
449. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
450. Id. at 512.
451. Id.
452. Id.
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Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason after a
dubiously conducted 1603 trial; Jesse Jackson, who was arrested
in 1963 for trespass and resisting arrest after attempting to be
served at a lunch counter in North Carolina; and Bertrand
Russel, who was jailed for seven days at the age of 89 for
participating in a sitdown protest against nuclear weapons. 455
Justice O'Connor noted that the Son of Sam law clearly
reached a wide range of speech that would not compensate the
criminals or the victims. Because the statute could include such a
wide range of speech, the majority concluded that the New York
statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objective
of compensating crime victims from the profit of crime.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared the New York Son of
Sam law inconsistent with the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. 4
56
Finally, the plaintiff, Children of Bedford, Inc., had also
asserted that the New York Son of Sam law violated the free
speech provision of the New York State Constitution. The New
York Court of Appeals acknowledged that New York's free
speech clause is more expansive than its federal counterpart.
However, it appears that because the court concluded that the
New York statute satisfied the strict scrutiny required by the
Federal Constitution, the statute would meet the broader
requirement of article I, section 8 of the New York State
Constitution that requires some type of "genuinely close fit"' 45 7
between the statute and its purpose. The court stated that "this
requirement is no more burdensome than requiring that the statute




456. Id. at 512.
457. Children of Bedford, 77 N.Y.2d at 731, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 463.
458. Id. at 732, 573 N.E.2d at 551, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
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